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We develop a theory of ﬁnancial development based on the costs associated with
the provision of external ﬁnance. These costs are assumed to arise within an environ-
ment where informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders are costly to
resolve. When borrowing is limited, producers with access to ﬁnancial intermediary
loans obtain higher returns to investment than other producers. This creates incen-
tives for others to undertake the technology adoption necessary to access investment
loans. Over time, as increasing numbers of producers gain access to external ﬁnance,
borrowers’ net worth rises relative to debt. This reduces the costs of ﬁnancial in-
termediation and raises the overall return on investment. The theory is consistent
with recent evidence that ﬁnancial development reduces the costs associated with the
provision of external ﬁnance and increases the rate of economic growth. Furthermore,
the theory predicts that ﬁnancial development raises the return on loans and reduces
the spread between borrowing and lending rates.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Cross-country studies have uncovered a contemporaneous correlation between the
level of ﬁnancial development and economic growth. King and Levine (1993) show
that this correlation exists across a variety of measures that capture both the eﬃ-
ciency and the extent of the ﬁnancial system. Further, the initial level of ﬁnancial
development predicts subsequent growth, and this result is robust to the introduction
of additional explanatory variables. Thus, ﬁnance may not be merely concurrent with
development, as ﬁrst shown by Goldsmith (1969); ﬁnancial development may cause
economic growth.
Most studies of ﬁnancial development have placed primary emphasis on the pro-
vision of external ﬁnance. It is commonly suggested that improvements in the ability
of ﬁrms to ﬁnance investment using debt or equity lead to signiﬁcant increases in
production or growth.1 Recent eﬀorts to address the issue of causality lend support
to this view. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) present industry-level evidence
that links ﬁnancial development to growth through the supply of external ﬁnance.2
They ﬁnd that ﬁnancial development raises growth disproportionately in industries
with relatively high external dependence. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998)
use ﬁrm characteristics to compute benchmark growth rates under the assumption of
limited access to external ﬁnance. They show that the fraction of ﬁrms whose actual
rate of growth exceeds their benchmark is rising in the level of ﬁnancial development.
Related research, seeking to identify the independent component of ﬁnancial develop-
1ment, has led to additional evidence for external ﬁnance as a leading channel through
which ﬁnancial development promotes economic growth. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) ﬁnd that, across countries, legal origins help determine the
extent of investor protection, the rights given to creditors and shareholders, and thus
aﬀect the supply of external ﬁnance. Using their measures of creditor protection to
isolate the predetermined component of banking sector development, Levine (1998)
ﬁnds that this channel of ﬁnancial development explains economic growth.3
To address these ﬁndings, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of ﬁ-
nancial development and growth. We depart from previous theory by focusing on the
costs of borrowing through ﬁnancial intermediaries in an economy with limited ﬁrm
access to external ﬁnance. Speciﬁcally, in an environment where producers operate
risky production opportunities and, if they have access to loans, borrow to ﬁnance
investment, we assume that it is costly for lenders to verify production. Financial
intermediaries arise to operate debt contracts in which the costly state veriﬁcation of
production occurs only when a borrower reports that he cannot fully repay his loan.
In this setting, higher levels of internal investment, ﬁnanced by producers’ wealth or
net worth, improve the likelihood of full loan repayment by reducing indebtedness.
Eﬀectively, net worth serves as collateral against debt. In equilibrium, producers in-
vest their entire net worth, which determines the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediation,
and thus the returns to both borrowers and lenders.
In our model, producers operating ﬁr m sw i t ha c c e s st oi n v e s t m e n tl o a n se x p e r i -
2ence higher returns to production and thus faster growth. This induces those unable
to borrow to undertake the expenditures necessary to engage in debt contracts. The
extent of the ﬁnancial system rises. Both the more rapid growth for producers with
access to external ﬁnance and the increase in the number of such producers serve to in-
crease borrowers’ net worth relative to debt. The consequent decline in indebtedness
improves the likelihood that ﬁrms will be able to repay their debt, thereby reducing
the frequency of veriﬁcation and the costs of lending. The mean return on investment
improves. Thus, ﬁnancial development is associated with increases in the extent of
the ﬁnancial system that raise the rate of growth by reducing the costs of external
ﬁnance. Driving these improvements in the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediaries is a
decline in the level of indebtedness associated with the typical investment loan. The
model exhibits joint causality between economic growth and ﬁnancial development.
Economic growth promotes ﬁnancial development by increasing borrowers’ collater-
alizable net worth. Financial development in turn raises the return on investment
and, therefore, the rate of growth.
We add to existing theory by developing a framework within which to examine
the role of external ﬁnance in the ﬁnance-growth relationship. In our model, ﬁnan-
cial development occurs as improvements in borrowers’ net worth reduce the costs of
ﬁnancial contracts. This mechanism has been studied in business cycle models that
examine the role of the credit channel in the propagation of shocks.4 Extending its
application to a model of ﬁnancial development, we are able to derive a theoretical
3foundation for the empirical ﬁndings discussed above. Furthermore, our study yields
several predictions: the reductions in the cost of ﬁnancial contracts that cause ﬁ-
nancial development also imply a rise in the return on debt, a decline in the spread
between borrowing and lending rates, and a decline in the premium commanded by
producers with access to investment loans. These results may help focus further
empirical examination of the ﬁnance and growth linkage.
We share with existing theory, in particular the important contribution of Green-
wood and Jovanovic (1990), a common emphasis that associates ﬁnancial development
with increases in the extent of the ﬁnancial system. In both models, ﬁnancial develop-
ment implies increases in the fraction of agents that have access to intermediaries. In
the Greenwood and Jovanovic model, intermediaries allocate savings more eﬃciently
than households; in our model, intermediaries help fund investment in ﬁrms.5 To
the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst formal analytical framework to provide a
nontrivial role for external ﬁnance, and thereby endogenize the returns to borrowing
and lending, in a model where both economic growth and ﬁnancial development are
endogenous.
To implement our analysis, in section 2, we ﬁrst assume universal ﬁrm access to
investment loans and develop a benchmark economy characterized by costly ﬁnan-
cial intermediation and endogenous economic growth. This allows us to present the
basic mechanism, isolate the eﬀect of collateral on the costs associated with ﬁnan-
cial intermediation, and examine the interaction between intermediation and growth.
4Next, we study the process of ﬁnancial development. Section 3 characterizes an econ-
omy’s transition path from an initial state, where not all ﬁrms have access to external
ﬁnance, to the limiting case outlined in section 2. Section 4 concludes.
2A b a s i c m o d e l o f ﬁnancial intermediation and
growth
We develop a benchmark model of costly ﬁnancial intermediation in an economy
where growth is endogenous and there is universal ﬁrm access to external ﬁnance. To
separate individuals into borrowers and lenders, we assume that in every period, with
probability 1 − ϕ, ϕ ∈ (0,1), an agent is allocated a production opportunity. Each
producer operates a linear technology that is subject to an idiosyncratic productivity
shock; capital is the sole input in production. Investment is ﬁnanced through two
distinct sources. First, the producer can use his own wealth for investment. Second,
this internally ﬁnanced investment may be augmented by borrowing. Individuals who
fail to obtain production opportunities appoint intermediaries to write debt contracts
with producers. This allows those without investment projects to allocate their sav-
ings. Lenders are unable to freely observe producers’ productivity shocks. Incentive
compatibility then requires that debt contracts involve, with some positive proba-
bility, the costly state veriﬁcation of the output of producers reporting suﬃciently
low levels of productivity. As all lenders may operate the technology that allows
5veriﬁcation, any lender can become an intermediary, and ﬁnancial intermediation is
competitive.
We assume that the costs of veriﬁcation are proportional to the quantity of out-
put produced. Implicit in this assumption is the belief that larger investments are
associated with more complex production processes and generate higher veriﬁcation
costs. This proportional cost structure prevents the economy from resolving the in-
formational asymmetries that drive ﬁnancial intermediation, by simply accumulating
wealth, as would occur in the more common case of ﬁxed costs.6 Furthermore, this
assumption allows the benchmark economy to exhibit balanced growth.
We assume, for simplicity, that all individuals have ex-ante identical preferences
with logarithmic period utility and a constant subjective discount factor, β ∈ (0,1).
To diversify the idiosyncratic risk associated with risky investment projects, producers
participate in mutual insurance arrangements.7 Furthermore, given a large number
of debt contracts, intermediaries can perfectly diversify risk for lenders and thus
are not subject to monitoring themselves. Taken together, our assumptions on risk-
sharing allow us to abstract from any potential eﬀect of the inequality of wealth
across producers and to focus instead on the eﬀect of the diﬀerence in average wealth
between producers and lenders upon the costs of ﬁnancial contracting. Moreover, as
seen in the next section, the insurance assumption allows us to capture the level of
ﬁnancial development through a single state variable describing the fraction of wealth
held by lenders.
6The sequence of events within each period is as follows. At the start of the
period, the production lottery occurs. Lenders appoint ﬁnancial intermediaries to
manage their wealth. Producers enter into debt contracts with intermediaries and
arrange group insurance. Next, each producer privately observes and reports his own
productivity. At this time, debt contracts are honored and costly state veriﬁcation
may occur. Afterward, lenders receive the return on their deposits, while producers
observe each others’ output and honor their insurance agreements. Finally, given
their wealth, agents determine the level of their current consumption. Note that,
while no producer may usefully report another’s output to any nonproducer, each
is nonetheless able to observe others’ productivity; thus producers can arrange for
contingent trades among themselves. We assume that no agent can be identiﬁed
by a lender in subsequent periods; this rules out multi-period lending arrangements.
Finally, we assume the complete enforceability of all contractual arrangements.
Let H index the set of all agents, and deﬁne HP (HL) as the current set of produc-
ers (lenders). For any producer i ∈ HP, output is given by the stochastic production
technology z(i)I(i),w h e r eI(i) is total current capital invested in i’s production tech-
nology, and z(i) is a shock that is independently and identically distributed across
i, with support [0,α], 0 < α < ∞, and distribution function F(z). F(z) is C2 and
F 0(z) > 0, ∀z ∈ (0,α). We assume full depreciation of investment capital and deﬁne
the unconditional expectation of productivity as ζ ≡
R
zdF(z).W i t hz(i)I(i) as out-
put, auditing by any individual j ∈ HL will incur a cost of λz(i)I(i),w h e r eλ ∈ (0,1).
7Thus, in the event that output is veriﬁed, net output is (1 − λ)z (i)I (i).8 We infor-
mally refer to the producer’s level of productivity, z (i), as the state in some of the
following discussion.
For any producer, let k represent the level of internal resources invested in produc-
tion, and let b deﬁn et h eq u a n t i t yo fd e b tb o r r o w e dt h r o u g haﬁnancial intermediary.
Total investment in the producer’s current project is I = k+b. The contract will allo-
cate debt to maximize the expected proﬁt of the producer, given his ability to diversify
risk, subject to the intermediary’s cost of lending. It will specify that the borrower
must announce his state after production, and it will determine which states are to be
veriﬁed and what the repayment for each is to be. We impose incentive-compatibility;
the contract must ensure truthful reporting of the state by the borrower. Given our
assumptions, the debt contract will be a standard debt contract.9
Feasibility constrains the repayment of the borrower to be no greater than output
in any state. Consequently, asymmetry of information between borrower and lender
provides the former with an incentive to misrepresent actual productivity in an eﬀort
to reduce his payment. This private information problem is overcome by the veriﬁca-
tion of all reported states involving suﬃciently low (given the cost of lending and the
amount borrowed) values of z. Within the remaining set of states, repayment must
be state-invariant to be consistent with truthful reporting of productivity; deﬁne γ so
that this cost is γ (k + b).I na n yv e r i ﬁed state, the intermediary receives all output
net of veriﬁcation costs, (1 − λ)z (k + b).N o t et h a tk is collateralized net worth, as
8its value, alongside the value of debt, is conﬁscated whenever the borrower is unable
to repay the loan. To induce the borrower to truthfully report low productivity and
request veriﬁcation, the ﬁxed repayment that prevails in the absence of veriﬁcation
must be infeasible for the borrower when actual productivity warrants veriﬁcation.
This implies that the repayment per unit investment in the absence of veriﬁcation,
γ, is also the highest veriﬁed level of productivity.
In summary, the competitive ﬁnancial intermediary will solve the problem de-
scribed by equations (1) and (2), given R and k. The objective function in (1)
represents the borrower’s expected return, while (2) ensures that the intermediary’s
expected return allows him to repay lenders the competitive return, R,o nd e b t .F o r










(1 − λ)zdF(z)+γ(1 − F(γ))
¸
(k + b) ≥ Rb (2)




(1 − λ)zdF(z)+γ[1 − F(γ)] (3)
and note that J0 (γ)=1− F (γ) − λγF0 (γ). We restrict the set of admissible distri-
bution functions F(z) by the following assumption.
9Assumption A
F 0(z)+zF00(z) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ (0,α)
O u ra s s u m p t i o ni m p l i e st h a tt h ee x p e c t e dc o s to fv e r i ﬁcation is not only increasing
but also weakly convex in the range of states subject to auditing. This ensures a
unique interior solution to the debt contract. It follows from this assumption that
J (γ) is strictly increasing on (0,γ),w h e r eγ ∈ (0,α) is the unique value such that
J0(γ)=0 , and is strictly concave. Thus the contract will never involve a level of
repayment per unit invested, γ,a b o v eγ. There is always a lower value of γ that
would achieve the same revenue and be preferred by the borrower, as it implies less
veriﬁcation and consequently higher expected proﬁt.
Lemma 1 establishes existence and uniqueness of the solution to the debt contract.
The zero expected proﬁt condition for the intermediary requires that (2) bind. Fur-
thermore, given the proportionality of total expected veriﬁcation costs to the level of
output, the optimal value of γ is independent of k, the investment directly ﬁnanced
from the producer’s net worth. However, k, which serves as collateral within the
contract, determines loan size. For any given quantity of debt, b, and given a level
of productivity, z, producers with greater levels of k will have higher output. This
raises the intermediary’s expected proﬁt, given γ. Thus, given that intermediation
is competitive, the loan size rises with k. The solution to the debt contract implies






(z − γ)dF(z). (4)
It is straightforward to show that T 0 (γ) < 0.
Lemma 1 Given assumption A, R and k, (a) there exists a unique γ ∈ (0,γ) that




An important implication of lemma 1 is that all producers face the same distribution
of returns on their share of investment, k. To see this, note that a producer’s proﬁt,
given z,i smax
³
0,(z − γ)(k + b)
´








dF (z),( 5 )





We now prove that producers’ individual rationality constraints are satisﬁed. Each
individual with a production opportunity will choose to participate in a debt contract
rather than producing autarchically (Q>ζ) or freely disposing of his project and
becoming a saver (Q>R ).
11Lemma 2 The contract implies that Q>ζ >R .
Proof. See appendix.
F r o ml e m m a2w ek n o wt h a ti na n yp e r i o d ,t =0 ,1,..., an individual with a
production opportunity will supply his entire savings, St,a si n t e r n a lﬁnance into
investment, k = St, and, given insurance, will earn ex post the expected return
Q. Those without such investment projects will earn R as lenders. Let Lt be an
indicator function that equals 1 if an agent obtains a production opportunity and
0 otherwise. After production, an agent allocates his wealth, (QLt +( 1− Lt)R)St,
between consumption, Ct, and savings, St+1. This allocation solves the following
lifetime expected utility maximization problem, where uncertainty originates through










Ct + St+1 ≤ (QLt +( 1− Lt)R)St, t =0 ,1,..., (8)
S0 given. (9)
Having stated the individual’s problem, we use a recursive approach hereafter
in characterizing behavior. Suppressing time subscripts, let V (S) represent the ex-
pected lifetime utility of currently having a production opportunity and W (S) be the
expected lifetime utility of a current lender. With probability 1 − ϕ, the agent will
12remain a producer in the next period; otherwise he will become a lender. V solves the
Bellman equation in (10) (primes indicate the value of a variable in the next period).















Lenders’ value functions, W,a r ed e ﬁned by a similar functional equation:















Standard methods (see Khan (1999)) may be used to prove that both lenders and
producers save at the rate β; the unit coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion associated
with logarithmic preferences implies that savings is unresponsive to the return risk
generated by occupational uncertainty. Thus S
0 = βQS for (10), and S
0 = βRS in
(11).





i∈HP ki as the economywide level of internally ﬁnanced investment and AL
as the aggregate supply of loans. The stationarity of the environment permits us to
describe equilibrium as determined by a value of R such that: (a) γ = T −1 (R) solves
each contract (1) - (2) given ki, i ∈ HP;( b )Q satisﬁes (6); (c) taking R and Q as
given, producers and lenders solve (10) and (11) respectively and (d) markets clear





Si.( 1 2 )








Assuming a large number of agents, the fraction of the economy that does not obtain
a production opportunity is constant and equal to ϕ in every period. This also
represents the fraction of total savings held by lenders,
P
i∈HL Si = ϕA.U s i n gt h i s
condition and (13) in (12), we derive the aggregate equilibrium debt to investment
ratio B
B+K = ϕ. This implies that the equilibrium R is that which determines the
value of γ such that the debt to investment ratio common across contracts, b
k+b,
equals the fraction of savings held by lenders. Lemma 3 shows how this equilibrium
condition may be used to directly determine γ.
Lemma 3 In equilibrium γ solves J(γ)/ϕ = T(γ) where Dϕγ > 0.
Proof. See appendix.











Since any agent receives Q with frequency (1−ϕ) and R otherwise, the economy-wide
average return on savings will be ρ as shown in (14).




Thus the average return in the economy falls below the marginal product of invest-
ment by the amount of output lost due to veriﬁcation. The rate of growth of the
economy, given that individuals uniformly save at the rate β,i sβρ− 1.
2.1 Summary of results for the basic model
This model of ﬁnancial contracts and growth provides a simple framework wherein
t h er a t eo fg r o w t hi sa ﬀe c t e db yt h ec o s t so fe x t e r n a lﬁnance. Each period’s pro-
duction lottery leaves a fraction of individuals without direct access to a production
opportunity. These lenders oﬀer investment loans to producers through ﬁnancial in-
termediaries. Given any required return on such loans, R, debt contracts determine
the unit value of investment opportunities, Q, for producers. In equilibrium, the
wealth of lenders relative to producers determines R to clear the market for debt.
The rationing of production opportunities implies a premium for producers rela-
tive to lenders, Q>R . An implication of the higher return to producers is that they
completely invest their wealth into the risky production opportunity. Consequently,
a weighted average of Q and R determines the mean return on investment, ρ,w i t h
the weights corresponding to the fraction of agents in the economy engaged in pro-
duction and lending. As seen in (14), ρ is falling in the cost of veriﬁcation, λ,p e r
unit output. More importantly, it is declining in the fraction of individuals who are
15lenders, ϕ. In particular, from (14) we have Dγρ = −λγF 0(γ) < 0; therefore, using
lemma 3, Dϕρ =( Dγρ)Dϕγ < 0.
A higher value of ϕ implies a relative scarcity of investment opportunities and thus
relatively high levels of lending associated with each available producer. In eﬀect, a
higher value for this parameter places a larger fraction of economywide resources in
the hands of lenders. Fewer producers and more lenders lead to a higher equilibrium
level of indebtedness associated with the generic investment loan. The rise in debt
relative to total investment raises the likelihood that any particular ﬁrm will be
unable to repay its loan and will be subject to the costly auditing of output. This
increases γ, the range of productivity levels subject to veriﬁcation, and raises the
expected costs of veriﬁcation for ﬁnancial intermediaries. The return to lending falls,
as does the average return on wealth in the economy. Hence ϕ serves as a measure
of indebtedness across production units. Higher levels of ϕ imply reduced net worth,
which serves as collateral, per unit debt. The reduction in collateral relative to debt
raises the costs of lending and reduces the return on investment and the aggregate
rate of economic growth. Thus, the principal result of the benchmark model is that
the level of indebtedness characterizing ﬁnancial contracts aﬀects the overall mean
return on investment and thus the rate of economic growth.
163 Financial development
We examine ﬁnancial development by generalizing the basic model to allow for en-
dogenous changes in the extent of access to ﬁnancial intermediaries and external
ﬁnance. This focus on the extent of the ﬁnancial system is motivated by the common
emphasis on the provision of external ﬁnance discussed above. Hence, we associate
incomplete ﬁnancial development with nonuniversal ﬁrm access to external ﬁnance.
This limit on the number of producers participating in loan arrangements with ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries will raise the level of indebtedness and result in higher costs
of borrowing and lending, relative to the previous model. However, higher proﬁts
for producers able to externally ﬁnance investment will induce others to undertake
costly expenditures that, if successful, will allow them the use of investment loans.
Over time, both the fraction of producers with access to external ﬁnance and the
proportion of total wealth held by such individuals will rise. This will increase the
level of collateralized net worth relative to debt within the typical investment loan.
The associated fall in indebtedness will reduce the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation
for the reasons discussed at the end of the previous section, and in the limit the basic
model developed there will describe this economy.
To limit the number of ﬁrms able to borrow, we assume that loan contracts require
a borrower to possess a commitment technology. Ownership of this technology, which
is speciﬁc to each agent and nontransferable, allows the holder to credibly commit
to a loan contract and, in particular, to allow veriﬁcation by lenders when necessary.
17Producers operating without this commitment and veriﬁcation technology are unable
to borrow; the infeasibility of multi-period contractual arrangements implies that
they would not repay loans, so they must self-ﬁnance all investment. The set of
all individuals, borrowers and lenders, with access to the commitment technology
is hereafter labeled the intermediated group, since producers in this set may borrow
from ﬁnancial intermediaries. The remainder of the economy are the unintermediated
group. As before, producers engage in risk-sharing, though now within each distinct
group. Note that the possession of a commitment device is relevant for an agent
only when he wishes to borrow. Individuals are unaﬀected in periods when they are
operating as lenders. Lenders in both the intermediated and unintermediated group
deposit their wealth with ﬁnancial intermediaries. However, these resources are lent
only to ﬁrms in the intermediated group.
The extent of ﬁnancial intermediation increases endogenously over time through
technology adoption by individuals. Speciﬁcally, all agents currently without access
to investment loans may invest resources to adopt a commitment technology. The
investments made toward technology adoption occur at the end of a period, after
production, and the payoﬀ is uncertain. The probability of successfully acquiring the
commitment technology, θδ,w h e r eθ ∈ (0,1), is increasing in the fraction of wealth
invested, δ. This assumption captures the essential elements needed for a study of the
interaction between ﬁnancial and economic development: obtaining access to external
ﬁnance is costly, with the probability of an individual’s successfully gaining access
18rising in the level of resources invested. Further, the assumption of constant cost
per unit wealth will highlight the role of collateralized net worth in the process of
ﬁnancial development. Alternative cost structures with decreasing unit costs would
yield predictable eﬀects of economic development upon ﬁnancial development.10
Let K represent the total savings or collateralized net worth of producers in the
intermediated group. Deﬁne the ratio of the total savings of lenders, AL,t ot h es u m
of their savings and the savings of these producers as χ =
AL
K+AL . Assuming that
wealth held by producers in the unintermediated group is a nontrivial fraction of
total producer net worth, χ exceeds ϕ with ϕ ≤ χ < 1. For producers with access
to external ﬁnance, we will show that 1− χ is the equilibrium fraction of investment
ﬁnanced using own resources or collateralized net worth. As a result, χ is an aggregate
state variable that determines the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediation, and thus the
returns to producers and lenders, at any point in time. Deﬁne R(χ) to be the return
to lenders and Q(χ) to be the return for producers within the intermediated group,
per unit net worth. As we shall prove below, the aggregate state evolves over time
according to a continuous process χ
0 = X(χ) where X :[ ϕ,1) → [ϕ,1).
In this economy with endogenous ﬁnancial development, ﬁnancial intermediation
and production are similar to that described in section 2. When they have access
to a production opportunity, agents become producers, investing their own resources
in their production opportunity and augmenting their internal investment with debt
ﬁnancing if they belong to the intermediated group. Financial contracts between
19producers and intermediaries continue to be described by (1) and (2), although, as
already mentioned, R is now a function of χ. Thus the characterization of debt
contracts provided by lemma 1 continues to apply, and all contracts involve a common
value of γ that is independent of k. However, this value, which solves T (γ)=R(χ),
now depends on χ; γ = Γ(χ).N e x t , g i v e n Γ(χ), the return to producers in the
intermediated group, Q(χ),i sg i v e nb y( 6 ) .P r o d u c e r sw i t h o u ta c c e s st ol o a n se a r na
return of ζ on their investment. Lemma 2 continues to apply, and Q(χ) > ζ >R(χ).
Therefore, all agents who obtain production opportunities, in either sector, invest
their entire savings into their projects.
We now describe the savings problem facing producers and lenders. Let V (S,χ;0)
represent the value function of producers, and W(S,χ;0) the value function for
lenders, in the unintermediated group. Deﬁne V (S,χ;1)and W(S,χ;1)as the value
functions for producers and lenders in the intermediated group, respectively. Given
the known law of motion for χ, expected lifetime welfare for producers in the unin-


















As before, S0 is savings, while ζS is current wealth given ζ, the return on investment
for producers without recourse to external ﬁnance. In devoting δ fraction of his wealth
20to obtaining access to loans, the producer has θδ probability of permanently joining
the intermediated group. Regardless of his group, in the next period he will be a
lender with probability ϕ, and otherwise will remain a producer. The lifetime utility



















Access to external ﬁnance, once achieved, is permanent, and there is no need to
invest additional resources towards retaining the use of the commitment technology.
Thus δ =0for agents in the intermediated group. Since the producers in this set
are able to supplement their own savings when investing, they earn the return Q(χ)
















Lenders in this group have current wealth RS, but otherwise face a welfare maxi-















Due to the constant unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution characteristic of
logarithmic preferences, all agents save β fraction of their wealth, net of any invest-
ments made by those attempting to join the intermediated group.11 Furthermore, this
unit elasticity and the common future probability of obtaining investment projects
imply that all individuals without the commitment technology allocate the same
fraction of their wealth toward technology adoption. As a result, the optimal value
of δ may be expressed independently of the level of savings, as indicated by (19),
which applies to all individuals in the unintermediated group. Thus, the savings rate
for any individual in the intermediated group is β, as before, while for those in the










The left-hand side of (19) represents the loss in lifetime welfare from the resources
devoted to technology adoption, while the right-hand side represents the discounted
expected gain, per unit wealth. The larger this expected gain, the higher will be the
fraction of resources devoted to joining the intermediated group. δ is a function of
χ0, since this determines future returns for producers with access to investment loans,
22and thus the gain from being able to use these loans. Since χ0 = X (χ),w ew r i t e
δ = ∆(χ).
We now study equilibrium using the approach of section 2. Deﬁne A1 (A0)a s
total savings within the intermediated (unintermediated) group, and A = A1 + A0
as aggregate savings. The sum of investment across ﬁrms with access to external
ﬁnance is K + B. As before, in equilibrium, the aggregate quantity of debt B = AL,
implying that the debt to investment ratio B
K+B = χ. Summing across groups, lenders’
total savings is AL = ϕA, again as before. However, now, recalling that production
opportunities are independently and identically distributed across agents, the net
worth of producers in the intermediated group is K =( 1− ϕ)A1.T h i sg i v e s
χ =
ϕA
(1 − ϕ)A1 + ϕA
. (20)
Since 0 <A 1 ≤ A, it follows that ϕ ≤ χ < 1. Generalizing lemma 3 by replacing





Lemma 4 In equilibrium, Γ(χ) solves (21) and Γ0(χ) > 0, Q0(χ) > 0 and R0(χ) < 0.
Proof. See appendix.
23When χ exceeds ϕ, the relatively low levels of collateralized net worth across
borrowers raises indebtedness within the typical loan contract, relative to the model
of section 2. This increases the possibility of insolvency and increases γ,r a i s i n gt h e
likelihood of costly veriﬁcation, and thus the costs of ﬁnancial contracts.
We have seen that ﬁnancial equilibrium is entirely a function of the debt to invest-
ment ratio, χ, which is a measure of the indebtedness of the typical borrower-producer
relative to total resources in production. We complete our study by examining the
evolution of χ over time. Solving the equilibrium condition (20) for A1/A allows us








where a(1) = 0, a(ϕ)=1and a0(χ)=−
ϕ
(1−ϕ)χ2 < 0.
Let the average rate of return for individuals in the unintermediated group be R0
and that for those in the intermediated group be R1. In the former set, ϕ fraction of
the population are lenders and earn R(χ), while the remainder, producers, earn ζ.
R0(χ)=ϕR(χ)+( 1− ϕ)ζ. (23)
In contrast, producers in the intermediated group earn Q(χ).
R1(χ)=ϕR(χ)+( 1− ϕ)Q(χ) (24)
24Since producers with access to investment loans earn higher returns on their pro-
duction opportunities, Q(χ) > ζ, the mean return on savings is higher for those in
the intermediated group, R1(χ) >R 0(χ). As shown below, this alone is suﬃcient to
raise the net worth of borrowers relative to lenders. Moreover, the inﬂow of wealth
associated with successful technology adoption serves to reinforce this growth in the
fraction of wealth held by producers using investment loans.
Suppressing dependence on χ, the law of motion for wealth held by the set of
agents in the unintermediated group is A0
0 = β(1 − δ)R0(1 − θδ)A0,w h e r eδ =
∆(χ) and β(1 − δ) is the net savings rate. Fraction θδ of this set transfers to the
intermediated group; the strong law of large numbers implies that the same fraction
of wealth is transferred. Recall that the savings rate across the rest of the population,
those belonging to the intermediated group, is β. This implies that the law of motion
for total wealth held in this set is A0









R1a + θδ(1 − δ)R0 (1 − a)
R1a +( 1− δ)R0 (1 − a)
. (25)
This allows us to infer the law of motion for the aggregate state variable, χ0 =
X (χ).A s s u m e χ = ϕ;t h e na(χ)=a(χ0)=1and χ0 = χ.T h u s χ = ϕ is
a steady state. The steady state economy is described by the model of section 2.
However, when χ > ϕ, a(χ) < 1,a n dt h ep r o p o r t i o no fw e a l t hh e l db ya g e n t si nt h e
intermediated group grows, since R1 >R 0 > 0.T h u s a(χ0) >a (χ) or χ0 < χ.W e
have proven the following proposition.
25Proposition 1 χ evolves over time according to χ0 = X (χ), such that, given any
initial value χ0 ∈ (ϕ,1), χ converges monotonically to ϕ.
The period by period reductions in χ imply equivalent decreases in borrowing
producers’ indebtedness. Lemma 4 indicates that the equilibrium value of γ falls.
We deﬁne this process, given its implications for the eﬃciency of intermediation, as
ﬁnancial development. Financial development raises the return on debt. However,
increases in its relative supply reduce the premium on collateralized net worth, and
Q declines.
We are now in a position to study the impact of ﬁnancial development on growth.
The average return on wealth in the economy is ρ(χ) ≡ [1−a(χ)]R0(χ)+a(χ)R1(χ).






zdF(z).( 2 6 )
Growth in the economy, g (χ) ≡ A0/A, may be calculated using the fact that A0 =
A0
1 + A0
0, along with the laws of motion for A1 and A0.
g(χ)=β
³
a(χ)R1(χ)+( 1− ∆(χ))(1 − a(χ))R0(χ)
´
(27)
Examining (26), we see that the average return on wealth is the expected return
from the production technology net of veriﬁcation costs, adjusted for the fraction of
production subject to intermediation. Over the course of ﬁnancial development, χ
26falls to its steady state value of ϕ, so the rate of return given by (26) will eventually
equal that in (14). While χ exceeds ϕ, access to loans is limited, and there is less
costly intermediation per unit investment. However, this is associated with relatively
low levels of internal resources held by borrowers. Scarcity of collateralized net worth
implies higher costs of ﬁnancial intermediation: Γ(χ) > Γ(ϕ). The limited access to
intermediation reduces veriﬁcation costs, while the increased indebtedness of those
who are able to borrow raises costs. At any given level of χ,t h ee ﬀect of a small
reduction on the overall rate of return and on growth is ambiguous without addi-
tional restrictions upon the distribution of productivity, F(z). Rather than exploring
suﬃcient conditions for monotonicity of ρ(χ) and g(χ), we prove that the process of
ﬁnancial development, represented by a reduction in χ, increases both on average.12
Proposition 2 Financial development increases both the mean return on savings and
the rate of economic growth on average.
Proof. See appendix.
The savings rate, which is independent of wealth or occupation in either group,
is at least as high in the intermediated group as in the unintermediated group; β ≥
β [1 − ∆(χ)]. Additionally, the return to production, per unit net worth, is also
larger for this ﬁrst set; Q(χ) > ζ. As a result, the shift in production from the
unintermediated to the intermediated group raises the mean economywide return to
producers, as well as the overall return to investment. Moreover, on average, the rate
of growth of producer wealth rises.
27We conclude this section by examining the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on the
spread between borrowing and lending rates. The return on debt is the opportunity
cost of internal funds for a producer, while the borrowing rate measures his cost of
externally ﬁnancing investment. The interest rate spread provides a measure of the
external ﬁnance premium, the additional cost of external funds. To calculate the ex-
pected real cost of borrowing, we must take into account the probability of veriﬁcation
and the resultant conﬁscation of output, as well as the nonveriﬁed repayment of γ.W e
call C the real expected loan rate, which is expected output net of expected proﬁto f
the producer per unit debt. Cb =
R α
0 z (k + b)dF(z)−
R α
0 (z−γ)(k + b)dF(z). Using







Deﬁne M(χ) to be the markup between the borrowing rate, C (χ), and the lending
rate, R(χ); M(χ)=C(χ)/R(χ). The following result implies that this interest rate
spread is increasing in χ.
Lemma 5 M (χ) is increasing in χ.
Proof. See appendix.
This establishes that the external ﬁnance premium falls as the economy ﬁnancially
develops.
283.1 Summary of results for ﬁnancial development model
We have examined ﬁnancial development in an economy where the extent of ﬁnancial
intermediation, initially limited, endogenously increases over time. The lack of uni-
versal ﬁrm access to investment loans implies that the debt to investment ratio across
ﬁrms in the intermediated group, χ, exceeds its long-run value of ϕ.T h i s y i e l d s a
relatively high level of indebtedness, which in turn drives up the costs associated with
the provision of external ﬁnance. However, the gain, per unit producer net worth, of
having access to external ﬁnance, Q(χ) − ζ,p r o v i d e sa ni n c e n t i v ef o ra g e n t si nt h e
unintermediated group to attempt technology adoption. Over time, more producers
are able to borrow, and the fraction of wealth held by the intermediated group rises.
As the wealth of borrowers relative to lenders rises, collateralizable net worth, rel-
ative to debt, increases within the typical borrowing arrangement, and χ decreases.
Consequently, the likelihood that a producer will be unable to repay his investment
loan, and will induce costly veriﬁcation, is reduced; Γ(χ) falls. As a result, the costs
of providing external ﬁnance fall and intermediation becomes more eﬃcient. Thus,
as the provision of external ﬁnance broadens, ﬁnancial development occurs. On av-
erage, this raises the return on investment and the economywide rate of growth. The
increases in the availability of investment loans are also associated with a rise in the
rate of growth of ﬁrms. Note the interaction between ﬁnance and growth. Growth
causes ﬁnancial development, in part by raising the wealth of existing borrowers and
in part by providing incentives for others to acquire the ability to borrow. Finan-
29cial development, in turn, raises the return to investment and thereby drives higher
growth.
Our focus above has been on the costs of external ﬁnance or, equivalently, the
eﬃciency of ﬁnancial contracting. Much of the empirical evidence estimates increases
in the level of ﬁnancial development using measures of the extent of the ﬁnancial
system. Financial development is commonly associated with a rise in the level of
external ﬁnance, relative to GDP. The process of ﬁnancial development described
here implies such a long-run rise in the provision of external ﬁnance. In particular,
the long-term increase in the rate of economic growth implies that borrowing, which
represents external ﬁnance in this model, will rise relative to output. To see this, note
that when total predetermined savings or investment is A, gross domestic product is
ζA. The fraction of this output that will comprise external ﬁnance, given a debt to
investment ratio of χ, is equal to the current savings of next period’s lenders, ϕg(χ)A.
The ratio of external ﬁnance relative to GDP is then
g(χ)ϕ
ζ . Proposition 2 indicates
that this ratio rises over time. The rise in the rate of economic growth associated with
reductions in indebtedness, χ, implies increases in the provision of external ﬁnance.
Thus, we see that increases in the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediation raise the rate of
economic growth and, in turn, these improvements in growth cause further increases
in the extent of the ﬁnancial system.
304C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
There is by now a large quantity of empirical evidence that ﬁnancial development
is correlated with and perhaps causes economic growth. Attempts to evaluate the
importance of the ﬁnancial system for growth have emphasized the external ﬁnance
channel. Increases in the supply, or reductions in the costs, of external ﬁnance ap-
pear to stimulate economic growth by increasing productivity across ﬁrms. We have
developed a dynamic general equilibrium model to address these empirical ﬁndings.
In contrast to previous theoretical work, our model economy includes a nontrivial
role for external ﬁnance in the ﬁnancial development process. Our theory is based
on the costs of external ﬁnance that arise when there are informational asymmetries
between borrowers and lenders that require costly state veriﬁcation of the returns
to investment. Financial development is associated with reductions in these costs
as the resources of borrowers increase. The implications of changes in net worth for
the costs of investment ﬁnance have also been emphasized by studies of the role of
the credit channel in the propagation of business cycles. In particular, the ﬁnancial
accelerator model examines how procyclical changes in the collateralized net worth
of borrowers amplify business cycle ﬂuctuations.13 By comparison, in the ﬁnancial
development model studied here, both economic growth and increases in the pro-
vision of external ﬁnance steadily raise borrowers’ net worth relative to their debt.
This raises the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial contracting, which in turn increases the mean
return on investment and, thus, the rate of economic growth. Our explicit focus on
31t h er o l eo fe x t e r n a lﬁnance in the relationship between ﬁnancial development and
economic growth has led to potentially useful implications for empirical work. Finan-
cial development generated through the external ﬁnance channel raises the return on
loans and reduces the spread between the borrowing rate and the return on loans.
Such results may help direct future empirical analysis seeking to distinguish between
theories of ﬁnancial development or to establish the quantitative importance of the
external ﬁnance channel in a general theory of ﬁnancial development.
32Notes
1. Examples include Bagehot’s writings (1873, pages 1 - 20) on 19th century En-
glish ﬁnancial markets, Cameron’s (1967, chapter III, page 75) work comparing
the Scottish and English banking systems, Hicks’ (1969, page 141 - 148 ) study
of the Industrial Revolution, and the discussion in McKinnon (1973, pages 10 -
14).
2. Many common measures of ﬁnancial development are based on the provision
of external ﬁnance. For example, King and Levine (1993) use domestic credit
relative to GDP as a measure of the extent of the ﬁnancial system, while Rajan
and Zingales (1998) add stock market capitalization. Examining these sources
of external ﬁnance, Levine and Zervos (1998) ﬁnd that both banking sector de-
velopment and active, large stock markets are signiﬁcant predictors of economic
growth. See Levine (1997) for a recent survey of this and related evidence.
3. This work is further extended by Levine, Loayza and Beck (1998) and Beck,
Levine and Loayza (1999).
4. An early example of a formal model is Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
5. See also Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and Greenwood and Smith (1997).
6. Examples of costly state veriﬁcation with ﬁxed costs include Townsend (1979),
Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1986), Boyd and Smith (1994) and Gertler
33and Gilchrist (1994). An assumption of ﬁxed veriﬁcation costs in our model
would imply higher returns to wealthier producers. This would complicate our
analysis by destroying the equilibrium approach we follow below and would
introduce the entire distribution of wealth into the aggregate state vector.
7 .T h e r ei sc o n s i d e r a b l ee v i d e n c eo fe ﬀective risk-sharing across individuals, even
in environments that are relatively undeveloped. Examining risk-sharing within
Indian villages, Townsend (1994) concludes that full insurance is “a surprisingly
good benchmark” (p. 539). Similarly, Udry (1993), in a study of risk-pooling in
rural Northern Nigeria, ﬁnds no evidence of informational asymmetries between
households engaging in mutual insurance arrangements.
8. We assume that the auditing technology and legal framework prevent stochastic
auditing. Boyd and Smith (1994) show that the welfare gains from stochastic
auditing are likely to be small.
9. A formal derivation of the debt contract is provided in the Technical Appendix
to Khan (1999), available from the author upon request. Townsend (1979)
and Gale and Hellwig (1985) provide analyses of insurance and debt contracts
under the assumption of costly state veriﬁcation. Williamson (1986) examines
equilibrium ﬁnancial intermediation using a costly state veriﬁcation paradigm.
10. Abstracting from borrowing and lending, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) pro-
vide a detailed analysis of the eﬀects of ﬁxed costs in a related environment.
3411. A formal characterization of the optimal policy for (15) - (18) is straightforward
but lengthy and included in Khan (1999).
12. Suﬃcient conditions under which ρ(χ) and g(χ) both increase monotonically as
χ falls are derived in Khan (1999). One example that satisﬁes these conditions is
the case of uniformly distributed productivity shocks, F (z)= z
α,w i t hϕ ≥ 1/2.
The distribution assumption is suﬃcient for ρ0 (χ) < 0, and the restriction on
ϕ then ensures that g0 (χ) < 0.
13. See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) or Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994). Additional references are contained in the recent work of Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1998), which also provides a more detailed discussion.
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39Appendix
Proof of lemma 1:
Part (a): Deﬁne P(γ) ≡
R α
γ (z − γ) R
R−J(γ)dF(z). The debt contract is equivalent
to max
γ∈[0,α]







γ (z − γ)dF(z) − [1 − F(γ)]
´
.A s ζ >R(see lemma 2), P 0(0) =
ζ
R − 1 > 0 while P0(γ)=−
R[1−F(γ)]
R−J(γ) < 0 and there exists γ ∈ (0,γ) with P0(γ)=0 .
For any such γ,a s s u m p t i o nA guarantees P00(γ) |P0(γ)=0< 0 hence it is unique. Finally,
The ﬁrst-order condition, P0(γ)=0 , may be rewritten as R = T(γ) where T(γ) is
given by (4).
Part (b): Equation (2) may be rewritten to yield the optimal level of debt, b =
J(γ)
R−J(γ)k.














while R = T(γ) with T0(γ) < 0. As lemma 1 proves γ > 0,w eh a v eQ>ζ >R .
P r o o fo fl e m m a3 :In equilibrium, B
B+K = ϕ . Summing bi over HP and substituting
R = T(γ),w eh a v eB =
J(γ)
T(γ)−J(γ)K or J(γ)/ϕ = T(γ).B o t h J(γ) and T(γ) are
continuous; J0(γ) > 0, T 0(γ) < 0; J(0)/ϕ =0< ζ = T(0) and J(γ)/ϕ = T(γ)/ϕ >






40P r o o fo fl e m m a4 :Substituting χ for ϕin the proof of 3 yields J(γ)/χ = T(γ),
which implies γ = Γ(χ) with Γ0(χ)=
J(Γ(χ))
χ[J0(Γ(χ))−χT0(Γ(χ))] > 0. Next the proof of 2
establishes Q0(χ)=
dQ
dγ Γ0(χ) > 0 and R0(χ)=T0(Γ(χ))Γ0(χ) < 0.
Proof of proposition 2: We will prove that (1) limχ→1 ρ(χ) < ρ(ϕ) and (2)
limχ→1 g(χ) <g (ϕ). To prove (1), note that limχ→1 ρ(χ)=ϕR(1) + (1 − ϕ)ζ, while
ρ(ϕ)=ϕR(ϕ)+( 1− ϕ)Q(ϕ). Using lemma 4, we know that R(1) <R (ϕ) while
Q(ϕ) > ζ. To prove (2), note that we have just established that RU(1) <R I(ϕ).S i n c e
0 ≤ [1 − ∆(χ)] ≤ 1, the result follows from limχ→1 g(χ)=β [1 − ∆(X (1))]RU(1)
< βRI(ϕ)=g(ϕ).









[J(γ)]2 Γ0(χ). Given lemma







=0 . Diﬀerentiation of this term yields
J(γ)(F 0(γ)+γF00(γ)) −J00(γ)
R γ
0 zdF(z) ≥ 0( > 0 if γ > 0). We conclude that
I0(χ) > 0.
41